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**Mechanism for effective rationalization of networks and platform in
Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa**

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**Aquatic Resource Economics & Governance
University of Sierra Leone**

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fisheries and aquaculture platforms and networks in Africa for anchorage to
appropriate regional organisations for enhanced capacities in project
implementation**

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Dar es Salaam, Tanzania



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- 3. Issues in plan rationalization**



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1. Governance of networks and platforms for effective rationalization

- The focus is on the crucial role of network/platform governance and its impact on network/platform effectiveness
- This is so because understanding the functioning of networks is important to comprehend why networks produce certain outcomes, irrespective of whether networks result from bottom-up or centrally planned processes




i. Forms of Network Governance

a. Participant-Governed Networks

The most common form is participant governance. This form is governed by the network members themselves with no separate governance entity needed. Governance can be accomplished either formally; for instance, through regular meetings of designated organizational representatives, or more informally, through the ongoing but typically uncoordinated efforts of those who have a stake in network success. At one extreme, participant-governed networks can be highly decentralized, involving most or all network members interacting on a relatively equal basis in the process of governance. This is what is referred to as shared participant governance. At the other extreme, the network may be highly centralized, governed by and through a lead organization that is a network member (e.g. RFBs?). Shared participant-governed networks depend exclusively on the involvement and commitment of all, or a significant subset of the organizations that comprise the network.



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NETWORK



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b. Lead Organization–Governed Networks

While shared, participant governance may involve many or all network members, there are many situations that may not be conducive to such decentralized, collective self-governance. In particular, the inefficiencies of shared governance may mean that a far more centralized approach is preferred. At the extreme, network governance can occur through what is referred to as a “lead organization.” In lead organization governance, all major network-level activities and key decisions are coordinated through and by a single participating member, acting as a lead organization. Thus, network governance becomes highly centralized.





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c. Network Administrative Organization

A third form of network governance is the NAO model. A separate administrative entity is set up specifically to govern the network and its activities. Although network members still interact with one another, as with the lead organization model, the NAO model is centralized. The network broker (in this case, the NAO) plays a key role in coordinating and sustaining the network. Unlike the lead organization model, however, the NAO is not another member organization providing its own services. Instead, the network is externally governed, with the NAO established, either through mandate or by the members themselves, for the exclusive purpose of network governance. The NAO may be a government entity, or a non-profit, which is often the case even when the network members are for profit firms.





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ii. Network Governance and Effectiveness

We have discussed the various forms of governance. But we need to develop a theoretical rationale for the adoption of one form over another in a way that can predict the successful attainment of network-level outcomes, or what some have referred to as network effectiveness. Based on what is known about networks and network interactions, there are certain critical exigencies that can be identified to explain whether or not a particular form of network governance is likely to be effective. It is not unreasonable to argue that choice of one governance form or another will be based, at least in part, on the discretion of key network decision makers.





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iv. Factor for Adoption of Form of Governance

Successful adoption of a particular form of governance will be based on four key structural and relational contingencies:

- Trust
- Size (number of participants)
- Goal consensus
- Nature of the task (needed network-level competencies).






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- **Trust**

Trust is critical for network performance and sustainability. Basically, trust can be explained as an aspect of a relationship that reflects “the willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviours”. Trust cannot only be viewed as a network-level concept but also that network governance must be consistent with the general level of trust density that occurs across the network as a whole. Specifically, shared governance is most likely to be an effective form when trust is pervasive throughout the network.






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• Number of Network Participants


A fundamental problem with governance of any network is that the needs and activities of multiple organizations must be accommodated and coordinated. As the number of organizations in the network gets larger, however, shared governance becomes highly inefficient, with participants either ignoring critical network issues or spending large amounts of time trying to coordinate across 10, 20, or more organizations. The problem of network complexity is especially acute when participants are spread out geographically, making frequent meetings of all participants difficult or impossible. The structural solution to this problem is to centralize network governance activities around a broker organization, either a lead organization or an NAO. Both forms are more readily able to accommodate larger numbers of network participants since the direct involvement of all organizations is no longer required for many network decisions.





- **Network Goal Consensus**


Consensus in goals allows organizational participants to perform better than when there is conflict, although conflict can also be a stimulant for innovation. The argument has important implications for understanding network behaviour, since network members must be responsive to the goals of both their employing organization and their network. Homophily has often been suggested as a rationale for explaining why certain actors are attracted to others and, thus, why network relationships form. The critical issue is how network relationships are governed. Self-governed forms are most likely to be effective when participants can generally agree on network-level goals. In this situation, participating organizations can work together without significant conflict, each making their own contribution to broad network goals while concurrently attaining their own goals. It is important to note here that trust is not necessarily related to goal consensus. Trust is based on reputation and past interaction experience, whereas consensus is based on goal similarity.





- **Need for Network-Level Competencies**

Regardless of the specific reason why networks are formed, in general, all network organizations are seeking to achieve some end that they could not have achieved independently. Different governance forms place a different burden on network members to provide required competencies. Internally, if the network's task is one that requires significant interdependence among members, then the need for network-level coordinating skills and task-specific competencies will be great, meaning that governance needs to facilitate interdependent action. Relating to the specifics of our analysis, it means that shared governance will be less likely to be an effective form of governance when interdependent task requirements are high, since demands will be placed on individual network members for skills they may not possess, like grant writing, quality monitoring, or even conflict resolution. Conversely, it is precisely these task conditions that favour lead organization or NAO models, which are more able to develop specialty skills related to network-level needs.





2. Rationalization of regulations for networks and platforms

We are concern here with two regulatory policy:

- i. Simplification of regulations
- ii. Reduction of administrative cost .






i. Simplification of regulations

The purpose is for removing outdated provisions and repealing obsolete regulatory provision and applied across the networks.

Specifically:

- *Evaluate adopted regulations and to ensure that the regulations are kept fully up to date*





ii. Reduction of administrative cost


- The goal of reducing administrative costs is aimed both at ensuring the efficient operation of the network administration and reducing administrative burdens on individual platforms.*

iii. Reduction of cost on administration

The aim is calculate and report the costs to administrative authority of any new administrative activities as a consequence of regulation. These requirements are likely to have aided the performance of the administrative burden programme by avoiding the hidden problem of platforms meeting their administrative burden target.

- Use of ICT solutions to support administrative burden reduction programme.*

Administration of the networks should be supported by the use of sophisticated ICT tools for the calculation of administrative burdens using the standard cost models.






iiB. Administrative burden reduction for individual networks/platforms

- *Policy on administrative burden reduction for individual networks/platforms*
- *Institutional framework, guidance and support to calculate the administrative costs of any new draft legislation*
- *Methodology and process*

According to the Standard Cost Model (SCM) every legislative proposal has to include an information note on its impact on the administrative burdens for individual networks/platforms

- *Public consultation and communication*
- *Use of ICT to reduce cost*






3. Issues in plan rationalization

a. Forge strategic linkages between RFBs and networks/platforms

Institute changes which for example determines that operation of RFBs and their relationship with networks require networks to prepare a strategy that set out local strategic priorities, the basis by which progress towards these priorities can be assessed and how local stakeholders are engaged in planning and delivery. In addition to strategies, and as part of the wider modernisation of RFBs and platforms, provide the basis for a review and subsequent rationalisation of 'Plans' between RFBs and platforms. This should be parts of a wider and continual process of RFBs and and networks/platforms modernisation.



b. Undertake scoping phase of evaluation


Given the close links between strategies and Plan Rationalisation, the evaluations of each (a Process Evaluation of Plan Rationalisation and a Formative Evaluation of Strategies) are being undertaken together.

The key objectives of the Strategies evaluation are to assess:

- If strategies added value?
- What progress has been made against RFBs and network policy objectives?
- What systems of monitoring have been established and what indicators of performance exist?
- What are the process outcomes (e.g. increased legitimacy, reduced bureaucracy)?
- What constraints and blockages exist to developing Strategies?
- The impact of Strategies on other issues (e.g. sustainability)?



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




The key objectives of the evaluation of Plan Rationalisation are as follows:

- Evaluate the processes adopted by RFBs as part of the general move towards a rationalisation of plan requirements on networks/platforms.
- Evaluate processes network/platforms have adopted in response to rationalisation of plans they have been required to produce
- Develop an analytical framework to enable an evaluation of the impacts of Plan Rationalisation in the longer term.

● Fishing Vessel
● Reefer
● Tanker
● Research
○ Bulk/Container





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Thank You